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ARTICLES
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Christopher S. Dadak *
This article addresses changes and notable analyses in approximately a year’s worth of Supreme Court of Virginia opinions,
passed legislation, and revisions to the Rules of the Supreme Court
of Virginia affecting Virginia civil procedure. 1 This article is not
meant to be all-encompassing, but it does endeavor to capture the
highlights of changes or analyses regarding Virginia civil procedure. The opinions discussed throughout this article do not all reflect changes in Virginia jurisprudence on civil procedure. Some
address clarifications or reminders from the court on certain issues
it has deemed worthy of addressing (and that practitioners continue to raise). The article first addresses opinions of the supreme
court, then new legislation enacted during the 2018 General Assembly Session, and finally approved revisions to the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia.
I. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Attorney’s Fees
The supreme court in Denton v. Browntown Valley Associates addressed several common issues regarding attorney’s fees. 2 The
plaintiff, James T. Denton, owned a large property in Warren
* Associate, Guynn & Waddell, P.C., Salem, Virginia. J.D., 2012, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, Washington and Lee University. The author thanks the
University of Richmond Law Review editors and staff for their patience and perseverance in
bringing the Annual Survey book to fruition and particularly their efforts on this article.
1. Due to the publishing schedule, the relevant “year” is approximately June 2017
through June 2018.
2. 294 Va. 76, 80, 803 S.E.2d 490, 493 (2017).
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County, Virginia. 3 In June 2005, Denton entered into a contract to
sell the property to Browntown Valley Associates (“BVA”). 4 The
contract included a $500 purchase money deposit that was placed
in escrow with a purchasing agent, a provision for attorney’s fees
for the prevailing party in litigation, and a timeline for the sale
settlement. 5 Through several amendments to the contract, the settlement date was postponed to October 2005. 6 BVA, however, refused to settle the sale and notified Denton’s agent in December
2005 that it was abandoning the purchase “because it was unable
to reach an agreement with the owner of an adjacent parcel about
improvements to a right-of-way.” 7 Denton’s and BVA’s respective
agents each put together release agreements which differed as to
the receiver of the deposit: BVA or Denton. 8
However, Denton refused to sign either release agreement. He
stated that “he had accepted BVA’s offer instead of competing offers because it alone had included no contingencies for settlement,”
that the offer had been made in bad faith based on the low figure
of the purchase money deposit, that the sale was enforceable, and
that “he intended to enforce it unless he received a better offer.” 9
He thereafter filed suit seeking specific performance and attorney’s
fees. 10 During litigation, BVA filed a counterclaim for its attorney’s
fees and costs incurred. 11 BVA prevailed in circuit court and was
awarded its attorney’s fees; Denton appealed to the Supreme Court
of Virginia. 12
The merits of the case are outside the subject matter of this article, but the supreme court’s analysis of the attorney’s fees issue
is germane. One of Denton’s points on appeal was “that the circuit
court erred by awarding BVA the attorney’s fees that it incurred
while countering his objections to its award of attorney’s fees on
the merits of his specific performance claim.” 13 Specifically, he argued that “he had reasonable challenges to BVA’s evidence and the
3. Id. at 80, 803 S.E.2d at 493.
4. Id. at 80, 803 S.E.2d at 493.
5. Id. at 80, 803 S.E.2d at 493.
6. Id. at 80, 803 S.E.2d at 493.
7. Id. at 80, 803 S.E.2d at 493.
8. Id. at 80, 803 S.E.2d at 493.
9. Id. at 80–81, 803 S.E.2d at 493.
10. Id. at 81, 803 S.E.2d at 493.
11. Id. at 81, 803 S.E.2d at 493.
12. Id. at 82, 803 S.E.2d at 494.
13. Id. at 90, 803 S.E.2d at 498.
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amount of the award of attorney’s fees it sought, so the attorney’s
fees BVA incurred while proving the reasonableness of the award
should not have been included in it.” 14
The court made short work of this argument. It held that Denton
“conflated the standard for awarding attorney’s fees” as sanctions
as opposed to a prevailing party pursuant to a relevant contractual
provision. 15 “In a case where the prevailing party is entitled to an
award of attorney’s fees, the reasonableness of the award it seeks
becomes an issue to be adjudicated in the case.” 16 “The attorney’s
fees that the prevailing party incurs while litigating the issue of
attorney’s fees are no different from those it incurs while litigating
any other issue on which it prevails.” 17 A prevailing party is thus
entitled to all reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the litigation,
including fees incurred proving those fees.
Practitioners in Virginia often feel that state courts are “safer”
with less exposure to a client as it relates to attorney’s fees. The
author has also often heard from fellow practitioners that fees incurred in determining and proving such fees are not recoverable.
The current trend of cases, however, is making clear that such a
view is mistaken. Combined with recent case law awarding highfigure attorney’s fees in low-figure verdicts, 18 it is apparent that a
party faced with a statutory or contractual basis for attorney’s fees
to the opposing side faces substantial exposure in state court. Not
only can the fees greatly outweigh the verdict, but a party will also
be liable for the opposing side’s fees in every step of the litigation,
including the steps required to prove the fees and any unsuccessful
appeals.
B. Res Judicata for Attorney’s Fees
The supreme court also analyzed the application of res judicata
to claims for attorney’s fees. Heather Graham was the CEO for

14. Id. at 90, 803 S.E.2d at 498.
15. Id. at 90, 803 S.E.2d at 498.
16. Id. at 90, 803 S.E.2d at 498.
17. Id. at 90, 803 S.E.2d at 498.
18. See, e.g., Lambert v. Sea Oats Condo. Ass’n, 293 Va. 245, 798 S.E.2d 177 (2017)
(holding that the court cannot limit attorney’s fees solely because a verdict awarded low
damages); see also Christopher S. Dadak, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Civil Practice and
Procedure, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 7–11 (2017) (analyzing the opinion in Lambert).
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Community Management Corporation (“CMC”). 19 As might be expected, Graham’s employment contract contained a confidentiality
clause. 20 The parties also executed a separate agreement providing
that the prevailing party in any action brought under the confidentiality clause “shall be entitled to an award of its attorney’s fees.” 21
After Graham left CMC for another job, CMC filed a lawsuit “alleg[ing] that Graham had breached her obligation of confidentiality with respect to [CMC’s] proprietary information.” 22 CMC requested the recovery of its attorney’s fees. 23 In response, Graham
filed “two demurrers, several pleas in bar, and an answer.” 24 However, in none of her responsive pleadings did Graham request her
incurred attorney’s fees. 25
The trial resulted in a defense verdict in favor of Graham. 26 She
then filed a new action seeking attorney’s fees she incurred in defending herself against CMC’s earlier action. 27 CMC demurred,
“arguing that Rule 3:25 required Graham to seek fees in the first
suit, and her failure to ask for them in that case constituted a
waiver.” 28 The circuit court agreed and dismissed Graham’s suit,
and she ultimately appealed. 29
Rule 3:25 of the Supreme Court of Virginia applies to claims for
attorney’s fees, and its terms are unambiguous. The rule states in
relevant part:
A. Scope of Rule. This rule applies to claims for attorney’s fees, excluding (i) attorney’s fees under § 8.01-271.1 of the Code of Virginia,
and (ii) attorney’s fees in domestic relations cases.
B. Demand. A party seeking to recover attorney’s fees shall include a
demand therefor in the complaint filed pursuant to Rule 3:2, in a counterclaim filed pursuant to Rule 3:9, in a cross-claim filed pursuant
to Rule 3:10, in a third-party pleading filed pursuant to Rule 3:13, or
in a responsive pleading filed pursuant to Rule 3:8. The demand must
identify the basis upon which the party relies in requesting attorney’s
fees.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Graham v. Cmty. Mgmt. Corp., 294 Va. 222, 225, 805 S.E.2d 240, 241 (2017).
Id. at 225, 805 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 225, 805 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 225, 805 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 225, 805 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 225, 805 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 225, 805 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 225, 805 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 225, 805 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 225, 805 S.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 225, 805 S.E.2d at 241.
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C. Waiver. The failure of a party to file a demand as required by this
rule constitutes a waiver by the party of the claim for attorney’s fees,
unless leave to file an amended pleading seeking attorney’s fees is
granted under Rule 1:8. 30

Graham attempted to avoid the application of this rule by arguing that under Virginia Code section 8.01-230, “she could not have
pled a claim for recovery of attorney’s fees until a defense verdict
was rendered in the prior action.” 31 The court clarified that “‘[s]tatutes of limitation [governed by Code § 8.01-230’s accrual concepts]
do not affect a cause of action; they bar a right of action,’ and while
‘[t]he two may accrue at the same time,’ they ‘will not of necessity
do so.’” 32 Any “‘injury or damage, however slight,’ is enough to trigger a claim.” 33 In this case, “Graham suffered an injury when she
was required to retain counsel to defend against [CMC’s] action
under the Confidentiality Agreement.” 34 So, “[h]er right of action
was not complete for statute of limitations purposes until she prevailed before the jury and—if no Rule had required her to plead the
fee claim—it would not have been time-barred until five years after
that verdict.” 35
As discussed earlier in the analysis of Denton v. Browntown Valley Associates, attorney’s fees can drastically increase a client’s exposure and are an important variable in assessing a case. As a
plaintiff, one must plead attorney’s fees and the basis of the fees in
the complaint. Thus, one must diligently review if there is any basis for claiming attorney’s fees when preparing a lawsuit. 36 On the
defense side, if the plaintiff has identified a basis for attorney’s
fees, then the defendant’s task is half-done. All that is left is to
simply review the plaintiff’s basis and determine whether it also
provides a basis for the defendant’s attorney’s fees. In a contractual
situation, “prevailing party” language should immediately result
in a defendant requesting attorney’s fees and identifying the same

30. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:25(A)–(C) (Repl. Vol. 2018).
31. Graham, 294 Va. at 227, 805 S.E.2d at 241–42.
32. Id. at 227–28, 805 S.E.2d at 242 (alterations in original) (quoting Thorsen v. Richmond SPCA, 292 Va. 257, 278, 786 S.E.2d 453, 465 (2016)).
33. Id. at 228, 805 S.E.2d at 242 (quoting Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 463, 699 S.E.2d
480, 482 (2010)).
34. Id. at 228, 805 S.E.2d at 242–43.
35. Id. at 228, 805 S.E.2d at 243.
36. Plaintiffs will often request such relief as part of routine pleading; however, without
identifying the basis, such practice is of minimal, if any, benefit.
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contractual basis as well. If the plaintiff does not request attorney’s
fees or identify the basis, then defense counsel, when reviewing
any relevant contracts or statutes for affirmative defenses, should
also look for any potential basis for an award of attorney’s fees. 37
C. Spoliation
Along with attorney’s fees and sanctions, spoliation is another
pitfall that keeps practitioners awake at night. The court issued an
important opinion in Emerald Point, LLC v. Hawkins on spoliation, which attracted significant attention. 38 Co-tenants (“Tenants”) of an apartment located in Virginia Beach filed a personal
injury suit seeking compensatory and punitive damages against
the landlord, Emerald Point, LLC (“Emerald”), and the property
management company, The Breeden Company, Inc. (“Breeden”)
(collectively the “Landlord”). 39
On November 26, 2012, the carbon monoxide (“CO”) detector in
the Tenants’ apartment went off. 40 Breeden sent a maintenance
worker who “replaced the batteries in the device, indicating to the
[T]enants that he believed the alarm was merely due to low battery
power in the detector, rather than a malfunction in the furnace.” 41
However, the alarm went off again after the worker left. 42 The following morning, one of the Tenants called Virginia Natural Gas
(“VNG”) about the detector. 43 “VNG dispatched an inspector” who
“measured the CO levels in the apartment at 37 parts per million
(‘ppm’), a rate significantly higher than the normal range and hazardous to human health.” 44 The inspector then “turned off the gas
supply to the furnace and ‘red tagged’ it as the suspected source of

37. Defendants often request attorney’s fees in stock language regarding relief in responsive pleadings. However, just like in a complaint, without identifying the basis such a
request is likely insufficient.
38. See 294 Va. 544, 808 S.E.2d 384 (2017). The 2018 General Assembly session included an attempt to introduce legislation effectively overturning the court’s decision. H.B.
1336, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2018). Expect the issue to reappear in the next General
Assembly session.
39. Emerald Point, 294 Va. at 549–51, 808 S.E.2d at 387–88.
40. Id. at 549, 808 S.E.2d at 387.
41. Id. at 549, 808 S.E.2d at 387.
42. Id. at 549, 808 S.E.2d at 387.
43. Id. at 549, 808 S.E.2d at 387.
44. Id. at 549, 808 S.E.2d at 387.
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the CO leak.” 45 The inspector specifically “indicated [on the red tag]
that the issue might be a cracked heat exchanger in the furnace.” 46
Then, “[l]ater that day, Breeden sent [a] maintenance worker . . .
to the [T]enants’ apartment to assess the problem.” 47 The worker
“declared on a City code enforcement corrective action form that he
had ‘[c]hecked furnace for CO[] leaks, checked vent pipes for leaks,
found vent pipe in attic to 2163, loose[.] Reattached and secured,
rechecked CO[] level it was at 0.’” 48 The worker was “not licensed
to make repairs to heating systems,” but nonetheless he “repaired
the vent pipe by using zip screws to secure the sections of the pipe
together, which is contrary to manufacturer specifications.” 49 He
“later returned to the apartment with . . . a code enforcement officer from the City, who likewise determined that the CO levels
were within the acceptable range.” 50 The enforcement officer “did
not go into the attic or otherwise inspect the furnace, flue or
vents.” 51 The red tag was subsequently removed with the enforcement officer’s approval. 52
Then, “[i]n the early morning hours of January 4, 2013, the
alarm in the apartment’s carbon monoxide detector sounded
again.” 53 At first, the “maintenance worker found no elevated CO
readings” but “later that day a VNG inspector found that the CO
readings were beyond the acceptable range and again red tagged
the furnace.” 54 “The same day, Breeden hired a heating and air
conditioning contractor to replace the furnace,” but that did not
lower the CO levels. 55 The attic above the Tenants’ apartment revealed “that the flue of the furnace in the adjoining apartment was
not properly connected and was venting exhaust, including CO,
into the attic.” 56 “When this flue was repaired, CO levels in the
[T]enants’ apartment returned to an acceptable level.” 57

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 549, 808 S.E.2d at 387–88 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 549, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388 (alterations in original).
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 550, 808 S.E.2d at 388.
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“[T]he old furnace was removed from the [T]enants’ apartment
on January 4, 2013.” 58 The Landlord stored the furnace “in a
maintenance bay for more than one year and . . . later disposed of
[it] well before the November 13, 2014 date when the complaint . . .
was filed.” 59 The Tenants filed a motion to have the court provide
“a jury instruction which would have directed the jury to accept as
an undisputed fact that the furnace had a ‘burned through’ combustion chamber and that this was the principal source of CO entering their apartment.” 60 The circuit court denied the motion but
decided to give, over the landlord’s objection, the following spoliation
instruction:
If a party has exclusive possession of evidence which a party
knows, or reasonably should have known would be material to a
potential civil action and the party disposes of that evidence,
then you may infer, though you are not required to do so, that if
that evidence had been available it would be detrimental to the
case of the party that disposed of it[]. You may give such inference whatever force or effect you think is appropriate under all
the facts and circumstances. 61

In denying the motion while providing the above instruction, the
court held “that the landlord ‘did nothing in bad faith’ in disposing
of the furnace.” 62
The “issue of first impression” before the Supreme Court of Virginia was “whether to warrant . . . the granting of an adverse inference instruction, the destruction of the evidence must be undertaken with the deliberate intent to deprive the other party of its
use at trial in a pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation between the parties.” 63 Specifically, the court analyzed
whether a party who is either aware or should reasonably be aware of
the relevance of evidence in its possession or under its control to either
probable or pending litigation, and fails to preserve such evidence
without bad faith shall be penalized by having the jury instructed that
it may infer that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable
to that party. 64

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 555, 808 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 555, 808 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 555, 808 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 555–56, 808 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 556, 808 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 556, 808 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 556, 808 S.E.2d at 391.
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The Landlord focused on two arguments on appeal. First, the
Landlord argued that “a spoliation instruction is not permissible
when the record demonstrates that the party charged with failing
to preserve the evidence was not reasonably on notice that the evidence was likely to be the subject of litigation.” 65 Second, the
Landlord argued that a spoliation instruction is not appropriate “in
the absence of an express finding that the responsible party acted
in bad faith by failing to preserve evidence with deliberate intent
to deprive the other party of its use at trial.” 66 The supreme court
decided the second argument was dispositive and therefore it did
not “need [to] address the issue whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that the [L]andlord was reasonably on notice that
the evidence of the condition of the furnace was likely to be the
subject of litigation.” 67
The supreme court began its analysis with a history of its prior
decisions and federal law on spoliation. The supreme court stated
that in Gentry v. Toyota Motor Corp., it held that “destruction of
the evidence . . . undertaken by a third party and . . . [without] ‘bad
faith’ by the party in control of the evidence” was insufficient to
warrant an adverse instruction. 68 In analyzing federal jurisprudence, the court found that “several federal courts applying common law principles had held that an adverse inference instruction
and certain other sanctions for spoliation are proper only where
the party has acted in bad faith or with intentional conduct calculated to suppress the truth.” 69
The supreme court also found federal rules and analysis of the
use of electronically stored information to be instructive. “Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2)(B) has since December 1, 2015 required a finding by the court that a party acted with the intent to
deprive another party of the use of that information in the litigation before an adverse inference instruction may be given to the
jury.” 70
65. Id. at 556, 808 S.E.2d at 391.
66. Id. at 556–57, 808 S.E.2d at 391.
67. Id. at 557, 808 S.E.2d at 392.
68. Id. at 557, 808 S.E.2d at 392 (citing Gentry v. Toyota Motor Corp., 252 Va. 30, 34,
471 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1996)).
69. Id. at 558, 808 S.E.2d at 392 (citing Bull v. UPS, 665 F.3d 68, 79 (3d Cir. 2012);
Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 644 (7th Cir. 2008); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007); King v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 337 F.3d 550, 556 (5th
Cir. 2003); Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003)).
70. Id. at 557, 808 S.E.2d at 392 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2)(B)).
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The rule’s advisory notes “provide[d] clear insight to its application” and were “helpful” to the court. 71 In relevant part, the advisory notes state:
Adverse-inference instructions were developed on the premise that a
party’s intentional loss or destruction of evidence to prevent its use in
litigation gives rise to a reasonable inference that the evidence was
unfavorable to the party responsible for loss or destruction of the evidence. Negligent or even grossly negligent behavior does not logically
support that inference. 72

The supreme court adopted this analysis for “all forms of spoliation evidence.” 73 It held that “the evidence must support a finding
of intentional loss or destruction of evidence in order to prevent its
use in litigation before the court may permit the spoliation inference.” 74 The dispositive element is “the determination that a party
intentionally failed to preserve evidence in order to prevent its use
in litigation where the party knew or reasonably should have
known under the totality of the circumstances that the evidence
would be material in a pending or reasonably probable litigation.” 75
But, the court cautioned that this analysis “is highly fact specific.” 76
“In this case, however, the evidence showed that the furnace was
disposed of only after it sat for more than one year in a maintenance bay before being discarded.” 77 To the court, the destruction
of evidence “resulted at worst from negligence” and the record “did
not demonstrate that it was motivated by any desire to deprive [the
Tenants] of access to the furnace as material evidence in probable
litigation.” 78
As previously mentioned, spoliation is an unpleasant thought for
every attorney, and particularly those on the defense. 79 The analysis in this opinion shows that it is a difficult area for jurists as
well. The “highly fact specific” nature of the holding likely means
71. Id. at 558, 808 S.E.2d at 392.
72. Id. at 558, 808 S.E.2d at 392 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note
to 2015 amendment).
73. Id. at 558, 808 S.E.2d at 392.
74. Id. at 559, 808 S.E.2d at 392–93.
75. Id. at 559, 808 S.E.2d at 393.
76. Id. at 559, 808 S.E.2d at 393.
77. Id. at 559, 808 S.E.2d at 393.
78. Id. at 559, 808 S.E.2d at 393.
79. However, practitioners should be mindful that there can be risk for plaintiffs as
well, particularly with the rise of electronic communications and social media.
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that any case with potential spoliation will be vigorously litigated.
Undoubtedly, proving a desire to deprive the other side of relevant
evidence is a high burden. This burden, however, reflects the reality that with the greater ability and capacity to maintain records,
documents, etc. comes the greater risk that some evidence (that
historically never would have existed) is accidentally destroyed.
The court seems to have found that the balance between the high
sanction of a spoliation instruction and the broad category of potential evidence requires that destruction of that evidence be done
with the intent to avoid its use in litigation. Expect to see more
legislative activity and more appeals on this contentious issue that
could swing a case.
D. Appeals from General District Court
In Robert & Bertha Robinson Family, LLC v. Allen, a case of first
impression, the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified procedural requirements for appeals from general district court (“GDC”) when
counterclaims are involved. The procedural and substantive history of the case is surprisingly complex and even includes an attorney’s least favorite topic: sanctions.
A landlord filed “a warrant in debt against the tenants in the
GDC alleging breach of a lease agreement.” 80 “The landlord sought
an award for unpaid rent pursuant to a holdover provision in the
lease agreement and for property damage.” 81 In 2005, the parties
had a written lease agreement with a five-year term. 82 The contract’s holdover provision
stated that if the tenants remained on the leasehold premises after
the expiration of the lease agreement’s five-year term, the landlord
“[had] the right, at its sole option and discretion, to [deem]” that the
tenants were “occupying” the premises on a “month to month” basis
“at double the annual minimum rent.” 83

The holdover provision “also stated that the tenants would remain subject to all other applicable provisions of the lease agreement.” 84 Further, the tenants were not entitled to any notice if the
80. Robert & Bertha Robinson Family, LLC v. Allen, 295 Va. 130, 135, 810 S.E.2d 48,
50 (2018).
81. Id. at 135, 810 S.E.2d at 50.
82. Id. at 136, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
83. Id. at 136, 810 S.E.2d at 51 (alterations in original).
84. Id. at 136, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
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holdover applied and the lease automatically became month-tomonth. 85 The lease
required the tenants to surrender the leasehold premises “broom
clean, in good order and condition,” and to “remove alterations, additions and improvements not desired by Landlord, [to] repair all damage to the [Leasehold] Premises caused by such removal, and [to] restore the [Leasehold] Premises to the condition which [it was] in prior
to the installation of the articles so removed.” 86

Finally the lease, as can be expected, required that any modification be in writing and signed by all parties and that lease provisions could only be waived if in writing and “signed by the party
against whom [the waiver] is sought to be enforced.” 87
The tenants occupied the premises for another four years after
the expiration of the original five-year term. 88 They “did not pay
‘double the annual minimum rent’ pursuant to the holdover provision.” 89 Instead, in 2015, a year after the tenants left the premises,
“the landlord filed the GDC warrant in debt seeking $4,410 in unpaid holdover rent and $20,590 for damage to the leasehold premises.” 90 The landlord nonsuited its claims and then refiled. The tenants then “filed a counterclaim seeking to recover their security
deposit.” 91
At trial, the GDC ruled against the landlord on its claims and
against the tenants on their counterclaim. 92 “[T]he landlord filed a
notice of appeal of the GDC’s denial of its claim for unpaid rent and
property damage,” but “[t]he tenants did not file a notice of appeal
challenging the GDC’s denial of their counterclaim, nor did they
file any additional pleadings in the circuit court asserting their
counterclaim.” 93
“[T]he landlord filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim arguing that it was not properly before the circuit court.” 94 Before that

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 136, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
Id. at 136, 810 S.E.2d at 51 (alterations in original).
Id. at 136–37, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
Id. at 137, 810 S.E.2d at 51–52.
Id. at 137, 810 S.E.2d at 52.
Id. at 137, 810 S.E.2d at 52.
Id. at 135, 810 S.E.2d at 50.
Id. at 135, 810 S.E.2d at 50–51.
Id. at 135, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
Id. at 135, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
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motion was heard and decided, the landlord “filed a motion to withdraw its appeal pursuant to [Virginia] Code § 16.1-106.1(A).” 95 The
motion to withdraw was based on the fact “that neither the acting
manager for the landlord, which was a family-owned limited liability company, nor the acting manager’s wife wished to continue the
suit due to health complications.” 96 The tenants, meanwhile, filed
for sanctions arguing that the “landlord’s claims [were] ‘completely
and utterly frivolous’ and not asserted ‘in good faith.’” 97
The tenants argued that the landlord had never treated the tenants as holdovers, that the parties had created a new oral lease by
which all parties abided, and that pursuant to the oral lease the
landlord “had agreed to accept the vacated premises without further restoration.” 98 The tenants also claimed that the landlord
should not have filed suit without having all of his evidence for
trial. 99 The landlord in response “maintained that the express language of the lease agreement . . . forbidding non-written modification or waiver of contractual rights, and requiring restoration of
the leasehold premises to its original condition . . . established a
good-faith basis for the landlord’s claims.”100
“The circuit court granted the landlord’s motion to withdraw and
the tenants’ motion for sanctions.” 101 “[T]he circuit court elaborated on its holding, stating that the landlord had violated its ‘duty
to have all evidence upon which it planned to rely on before ever
filing suit.’” 102 Because “the landlord’s lawsuit would be ‘a per se
violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b),’” then “similarly
such filing of a lawsuit without all evidence in hand in Virginia
is . . . a violation of [Code] § 8.01-271.1.”103
The circuit court denied the landlord’s motion to dismiss the tenants’ counterclaim and “summarily awarded the tenants $2,600 on
their counterclaim without hearing evidence on the matter.” 104 Unsurprisingly, “[t]he landlord filed a motion to reconsider” which the

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 135, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
Id. at 135, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
Id. at 137, 810 S.E.2d at 52.
Id. at 137–38, 810 S.E.2d at 52.
Id. at 138, 810 S.E.2d at 52.
Id. at 138, 810 S.E.2d at 52 (citations omitted).
Id. at 135, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
Id. at 138, 810 S.E.2d at 52.
Id. at 138, 810 S.E.2d at 52–53 (second alteration in original).
Id. at 135–36, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
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circuit court denied and then “awarded $10,000 in attorneys fees
against the landlord as sanctions for the landlord’s withdrawn
claims.” 105 The landlord appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 106
The Supreme Court of Virginia first tackled the circuit court’s
award of sanctions. In reviewing such an award for abuse of discretion, the court applies
an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a litigant and his attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a
reasonable belief that the pleading was well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and not interposed for an improper purpose. 107

The supreme court looked at the text of Virginia Code section
8.01-271.1 and found that it “does not, as the circuit court ruled,
place a ‘duty’ on a claimant ‘to have all evidence upon which it
planned to rely on before ever filing suit.’” 108 The court held that
rather than requiring that a claim be “exhaustively supported with
every conceivable fact that the party may plan to use at trial,” the
statute requires that a “claim must be ‘well grounded in fact.’” 109
The Supreme Court of Virginia also found that the circuit court
failed to analyze the legal sufficiency “of the landlord’s claims at
the time that the landlord filed the notice of appeal.” 110 The landlord’s claims “relied on clearly worded provisions of the lease agreement: one increasing the rent if the tenants became holdovers and
the other requiring the tenants to restore the leasehold premises
to its original condition.” 111 The fact “that the tenants believed, not
without reason, that they had a strong factual argument either
that the parties had entered into a new oral lease or that the landlord had waived the terms of the original lease” was not dispositive
for sanctions. 112 “[U]nless an expected defense is so irrefutable as
105. Id. at 136, 810 S.E.2d at 51.
106. Id. at 134, 810 S.E.2d at 50.
107. Id. at 139, 810 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting Kambis v. Considine, 290 Va. 460, 466, 778
S.E.2d 117, 120 (2015)).
108. Id. at 139, 810 S.E.2d at 53 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015 &
Cum. Supp. 2017)).
109. Id. at 139, 810 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015 &
Cum. Supp. 2017)).
110. Id. at 139–40, 810 S.E.2d at 53.
111. Id. at 140, 810 S.E.2d at 53.
112. Id. at 140, 810 S.E.2d at 53.
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to render a claimant’s theory of relief frivolous, ‘claims which are
recognized under Virginia law, and as to which the essential elements were pled, are not sanctionable even if they do not prevail
on the merits.’” 113
The supreme court found that the landlord had a viable, if ultimately unlikely to succeed, Statute of Frauds response to the tenants’ defense of waiver. 114 Because “[t]he landlord reasonably contested the tenants’ assertions of a new oral lease and a waiver of
the written lease terms . . . , the landlord’s claims were wellgrounded in fact and warranted by existing law.” 115
After finding that the circuit court’s statutory and legal sufficiency bases were lacking, the supreme court addressed the tenants’ alternative grounds for sanctions. The tenants argued that
sanctions were alternatively warranted because of “‘the protracted
history of the litigation . . . ,’ namely the nonsuit” and the GDC’s
dismissal of the landlord’s claims. 116 The court reflected that “[p]rotracted litigation is a regrettable reality in the modern adversarial
process” and noted that the landlord’s procedural actions in this
case were “not intrinsic badges of bad faith.” 117 Instead, there was
nothing in the record to “warrant the inference that the landlord
acted with an improper purpose.” 118 The supreme court thus reversed and dismissed the circuit court’s award of sanctions. 119
The supreme court then turned to the procedural issue of
whether the tenants’ counterclaim was even properly before the
circuit court for an award. The landlord claimed the tenants’ failure to appeal the GDC’s dismissal of the counterclaim was fatal. 120
The tenants argued that the landlord’s appeal of the GDC’s dismis-

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 140, 810 S.E.2d at 53.
Id. at 140–41, 810 S.E.2d at 53–54.
Id. at 140–41, 810 S.E.2d at 54.
Id. at 141, 810 S.E.2d at 54.
Id. at 142, 810 S.E.2d at 54. However, the court cautioned that
it is conceivable that a litigant could initiate litigation, nonsuit and refile the
claim, and then fight to the bitter end, all for the singular purpose of harassing
an opponent and depleting his resources. If that were the case, it would not
matter that the litigant’s “pleadings were ‘well grounded in fact’ and ‘warranted by existing law’” because even facially legitimate pleadings cannot be
filed for “an improper purpose.”
Id. at 142, 810 S.E.2d at 54.
118. Id. at 142, 810 S.E.2d at 54.
119. Id. at 152, 810 S.E.2d at 60.
120. Id. at 142, 810 S.E.2d at 55.
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sal of its claim also served as an appeal of the counterclaim’s dismissal. 121 The court noted that “[a] leading scholar of Virginia procedural law, Judge J.R. Zepkin, observed years ago that, in GDC
cases involving consolidated claims by several parties, ‘[t]here is
no clear guidance on what happens . . . if one of multiple losing parties wishes to appeal’” and also observed that the subject litigation
“present[ed] an opportunity to provide that guidance.” 122
The supreme court began with the history and progression of the
“modern American appellate system” from the “ancient world.” 123
“The current process governing appeals from the GDC to the circuit
court originated with the courts of record exercising supervisory
oversight over courts not of record.” 124 “Prior to 1973, courts not of
record fell under the umbrella of the justice-of-the-peace system,
which was composed of a variety of inferior courts with limited jurisdiction.” 125 “In 1973, courts not of record were brought under a
unified system of district courts.” 126
The supreme court repeated that “‘[i]n case after case’ involving
appeals from courts not of record, [it has] ‘in clear, unequivocal,
and emphatic language repeatedly said that “[t]he right of appeal
is statutory and the statutory procedural prerequisites must be observed.”’” 127 “Absent a statutory authorization or a constitutional
mandate, no party has a right to a de novo appeal of the GDC’s
judgment in the circuit court.” 128 Practices among attorneys, such
as the “piggyback” theory, “by themselves, cannot create this
right.” 129 Without a constitutional or statutory basis, “the GDC’s
adverse judgment on [the tenants’] counterclaim was not properly
before the circuit court.” 130
The supreme court then analyzed the relevant statutory provisions. Virginia Code section 16.1-106 “grants ‘an appeal of right’
121. Id. at 142, 810 S.E.2d at 55.
122. Id. at 142–43, 810 S.E.2d at 55 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting
J.R. Zepkin, The Rules of Court for the General District Courts of Virginia, 23 U. RICH. L.
REV. 809, 829 n.43 (1989)).
123. Id. at 143, 810 S.E.2d at 55.
124. Id. at 144, 810 S.E.2d at 56.
125. Id. at 144, 810 S.E.2d at 56.
126. Id. at 144, 810 S.E.2d at 56.
127. Id. at 144, 810 S.E.2d at 56 (alterations in original) (quoting Covington Virginian,
Inc. v. R.C. Woods, 182 Va. 538, 543, 29 S.E.2d 406, 409 (1944)).
128. Id. at 145, 810 S.E.2d at 56.
129. Id. at 145, 810 S.E.2d at 56.
130. Id. at 145, 810 S.E.2d at 56.
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to a litigant from ‘any order entered or judgment rendered in a
court not of record in a civil case’ when the ‘matter in controversy’
exceeds $20.” 131 Virginia Code section 16.1-107 “states that no appeal ‘shall be allowed unless and until the party applying for the
same’ provides an appropriate bond ‘sufficient to satisfy the judgment of the court in which it was rendered.’” 132 It “also requires the
‘party applying for appeal’ to pay a writ tax to the circuit court.” 133
Under the tenants’ argument, “a notice of appeal filed by one
litigant appeals the entire case on behalf of all other litigants in
the GDC case, even the claims of those litigants against whom the
appealing party prevailed.” 134 “In other words, an appeal by one
party converts all other parties into de facto appellants on every
adverse ruling of the GDC.” 135 The supreme court did not agree
with the tenants’ statutory interpretation. 136
The supreme court noted that Virginia Code section 16.1-106
“does not require the appealing party to appeal every adverse ruling of the GDC” but, instead, allows a party to appeal any adverse
ruling as a matter of right. 137 The court also noted the tenants’
statutory interpretation would have certain undesirable and illogical results. 138 “Under the tenants’ contrary view, a party cannot
appeal a loss on one claim without forfeiting his wins on other
claims against other parties.” 139 This means that when “the losing
defendant in the GDC files a notice of appeal but neither the plaintiff nor the winning defendant do, under the tenants’ view of the
appellate process, the winning defendant loses his victory even
though the losing plaintiff never appealed that loss.” 140
The supreme court also explained that the tenants’ position was
incompatible with the bond and writ requirements and the same

131. Id. at 145, 810 S.E.2d at 56 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 16.01-106 (Repl. Vol. 2015 &
Cum. Supp. 2017)).
132. Id. at 145, 810 S.E.2d at 56 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-107 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
133. Id. at 145, 810 S.E.2d at 56 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-107 (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
134. Id. at 145–46, 810 S.E.2d at 56.
135. Id. at 145, 810 S.E.2d at 56.
136. Id. at 145, 810 S.E.2d at 56.
137. Id. at 145, 810 S.E.2d at 56 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.106 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum.
Supp. 2017)).
138. See id. at 145–46, 810 S.E.2d at 56–57.
139. Id. at 145, 810 S.E.2d at 56–57.
140. Id. at 146, 810 S.E.2d at 57.
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appeal process if a counterclaim was filed as a separate suit. 141 Applying the tenants’ logic, “a circuit court may review an unappealed
judgment on a counterclaim but cannot review an unappealed
judgment on the same cause of action when filed as a separate GDC
action rather than a counterclaim.” 142 This result is contrary to the
law’s preference for counterclaims “in an effort to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits and the danger of inconsistent judgments.” 143
Further, the court found that the tenants’ interpretation would
mean that not only can a party “piggyback” an appeal on its counterclaim but it must also be able to “piggyback” on the opposing
side’s payment of the bond and writ. 144 “[U]nder the tenants’ view,
the party filing the notice of appeal must strictly comply with the
statutory bond requirement, while the party filing no notice of appeal does not.” 145 The court found that such a result was unfair and
not supported by the relevant statutes. 146
The supreme court next addressed the tenants’ reliance on Virginia Code section 16.1-88.01 which “authorizes counterclaims and
grants discretion to the GDC to try claims and counterclaims together or separately.” 147 The tenants point to the requirement that
the court enter “such final judgment on the whole case as the law
and the evidence require” as proof that “the only thing that can be
appealed by any party is the ‘whole case.’” 148 The court characterized the argument as “superficially attractive” but a “fail[ure] as a
non sequitur.” 149 The court explained that the “whole case” language simply reflects the requirement that an appeal must be of a
“final judgment,” which in turn by definition must dispose of an

141. Id. at 146–47, 810 S.E.2d at 57–58.
142. Id. at 146, 810 S.E.2d at 57.
143. Id. at 146, 810 S.E.2d at 57 (quoting W. HAMILTON BRYSON, BRYSON ON VIRGINIA
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.04[1], at 6-85 (5th ed. 2017)).
144. Id. at 146–47, 810 S.E.2d at 57.
145. Id. at 147, 810 S.E.2d at 57.
146. Id. at 147, 810 S.E.2d at 57. The court also noted that the statute on withdrawing
an appeal “dissuades [the court] from adopting the tenants’ position” because it refers to the
“‘party who has appealed a final judgment or order’ . . . as distinguished from ‘the party who
did not appeal.’” Id. at 147, 810 S.E.2d at 57 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-106.1 (Repl. Vol.
2015 & Cum. Supp. 2017)).
147. Id. at 147, 810 S.E.2d at 58 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-88.01 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
148. Id. at 147–48, 810 S.E.2d at 58 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-88.01 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
149. Id. at 148, 810 S.E.2d at 58.
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“entire action” or “whole case.” 150 The court did not find that Virginia Code section helpful in “answer[ing] the question before
[it].” 151
The supreme court continued its analysis by assessing the tenants’ argument that a circuit court’s de novo review requires that
it “adjudicate both appealed and unappealed rulings in order to
conduct a proper . . . review.” 152 The tenants pressed that “the destruction of a lower court judgment necessarily results in some collateral consequences, including the continuation of litigation over
aspects of the judgment that were not specifically appealed by any
party.” 153 However, the supreme court noted that “[t]he scope of
appellate review is not determined by the standard of review” as
“[t]he two are very different concepts.” 154 Finally, the tenants’ “destruction theory” went “too far.” 155 Procedurally, the GDC’s judgment is intact until “a trial de novo has commenced on the merits
of the case.” 156 Similarly, abandoned counterclaims cannot be resurrected at the circuit court stage, contradicting the “destruction”
theory. 157
The supreme court concluded that the statutory “appeal of
right belongs [only] to the party applying for the same.” 158 It explicitly held that “any party seeking on appeal to change or modify
an unfavorable disposition of a claim [including counterclaims,
cross-claims, or third-party claims] asserted by or against him
must file a notice of appeal.” 159 Otherwise, “the GDC’s judgment on
the claim [remains] intact and subject to res-judicata principles.” 160
This case clarifies the appellate procedure for multiparty and
multiclaim actions in GDCs. It exposes a potential pitfall for unwary practitioners. Attorneys will often settle or attempt to settle

150. Id. at 148, 810 S.E.2d at 58. Specifically, the court noted the terms are essentially
interchangeable. Id. at 148, 810 S.E.2d at 58.
151. Id. at 148, 810 S.E.2d at 58.
152. Id. at 148, 810 S.E.2d at 58.
153. Id. at 149, 810 S.E.2d at 59.
154. Id. at 149, 810 S.E.2d at 58.
155. Id. at 149, 810 S.E.2d at 59.
156. Id. at 150, 810 S.E.2d at 59 (quoting Commonwealth v. Diaz, 266 Va. 260, 266, 585
S.E.2d 552, 555 (2003)).
157. Id. at 150, 810 S.E.2d at 59.
158. Id. at 151, 810 S.E.2d at 60 (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 151–52, 810 S.E.2d at 60.
160. Id. at 152, 810 S.E.2d at 60.
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cases after a GDC verdict. Now, however, if such settlement discussions are not finalized within ten days of judgment, a party may
not note an appeal of its claim, while the opposing party does note
an appeal and its claim survives. 161 Of course, the risk is mainly
with verdicts that are either unfavorable or not the full extent of
the relief sought.
An example may be best. A plaintiff sues for damages, and the
defendant files a counterclaim. The court enters judgment in favor
of both but for less than the amounts sought. If the plaintiff fails
to appeal but the defendant does appeal, then the defendant has
greatly increased his or her leverage for settlement. Not only is the
plaintiff’s judgment (at least temporarily) gone, the plaintiff is (at
least theoretically) also facing a risk of a lesser verdict in circuit
court and the defendant’s right to collect on its (now final) verdict.
E. Res judicata in Pending Claims
In Kellog v. Green, the supreme court addressed the effect that
the pendency of an issue or claim has on res judicata analysis. 162
Connie Kellogg and Christopher B. Green were married from August 1998 until April 2015. 163 A final decree of divorce was entered
on April 9, 2015, which incorporated two pre-marital agreements
and a provision that the case be “stricken from the docket.” 164
Kellogg filed a motion to amend the order to change a date in the
order and also a petition for a rule to show cause. 165 The petition
argued that pursuant to one of the pre-marital agreements, “Green
was ‘indebted to [Kellogg] in the sum of $5,000.00 for each year
[Kellogg and Green] were married,’ which totaled $82,949.44 for
their sixteen-and-one-half-year marriage.” 166 On September 16,
2015, the circuit court entered an amended final order stating that
“[t]he sole purpose for the entry of [the Amended Final Decree] is
to correct the date the [Amended] Pre-Marital Agreement was
signed by the parties from March 18, 2004 to March 18, 2003” and
that “this cause shall remain on the docket of [the circuit court] for
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 151, 810 S.E.2d at 60.
295 Va. 39, 43–44, 809 S.E.2d 631, 634 (2018).
Id. at 41, 809 S.E.2d at 632–33 (2018).
Id. at 41–42, 809 S.E.2d at 633.
Id. at 42, 809 S.E.2d at 633.
Id. at 42, 809 S.E.2d at 633 (alterations in original).
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the purposes of enforcing the terms of the Agreements.” 167 “On
October 1, 2015, the circuit court entered an order which memorialized the granting of the motion to amend . . . and dismissed the
. . . Petition.” 168
On April 29, 2016, Kellogg filed a separate action seeking the
same $82,949.44 and attorney’s fees. 169 Kellogg again claimed that
a pre-marital agreement entitled her to $5000 “for each year of
their sixteen-and-one-half-year marriage.” 170 Her complaint also
alleged that “Green’s liability ‘became liquidated and due and payable’ as of the entry of the [final order].” 171 In response, Green filed
a plea of res judicata, arguing that “pursuant to Rule 1:6, Kellogg
was barred from bringing the [claim] because she had sought identical relief in the . . . [p]etition . . . and the circuit court had dismissed that petition [in the October 2015 order], which was a final
order.” 172 The circuit court agreed and dismissed the action with
prejudice. 173 The circuit court denied Kellogg’s motion for reconsideration holding that “‘pursuant to Rule 1:6, and the Lee v. Spoden
case, . . . the issues that were raised by the filing of the breach of
contract [are] the same issues that were raised in the contempt
proceeding,’ and for those reasons, ‘res judicata applies . . . .’” 174
Kellogg appealed, arguing that there was no relevant final order. 175
The parties’ arguments hinged on the relevance of the divorce
action pending throughout the litigation. Kellogg argued that “the
element of finality [was] missing” because the circuit court expressly retained jurisdiction for enforcement and since the divorce
was still pending, “she could not appeal the [October 2015 order],
and to find that res judicata bars her from bringing a collateral
action ‘would produce an absurd, and inequitable, result.’” 176 Green
meanwhile argued that the October 2015 order “was a final, con-

167. Id. at 42, 809 S.E.2d at 633 (alterations in original). Notably this order was
amended nunc pro tunc to April 9, 2015. Id. at 42, 809 S.E.2d at 633.
168. Id. at 42, 809 S.E.2d at 633.
169. Id. at 43, 809 S.E.2d at 633.
170. Id. at 43, 809 S.E.2d at 633.
171. Id. at 43, 809 S.E.2d at 633.
172. Id. at 43, 809 S.E.2d at 633.
173. Id. at 43, 809 S.E.2d at 633.
174. Id. at 43, 809 S.E.2d at 634 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (citing Lee v.
Spoden, 290 Va. 235, 776 S.E.2d 798 (2015)).
175. Id. at 43, 809 S.E.2d at 634.
176. Id. at 43–44, 809 S.E.2d at 634.
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clusive order that disposed of all of Kellogg’s claims for relief, regardless of whether the [divorce] remains pending” and that
“Lee stands for the proposition that ‘if the claimant moves on a
cause of action and is denied, then the same claimant is barred
from future actions based on the same cause of action.’” 177 Green
further argued that the October 2015 order “was still an appealable final order because it concerned a ‘domestic relations matter’
and Code § 17.1-405 ‘permits an appeal upon the denial of a matter
raised under Title 20,’ which governs domestic relations.” 178
The supreme court began its analysis by reviewing the definition
of a “final judgment”:
A decree that enters judgment for a party is not final if it “expressly
provides that the court retains jurisdiction to reconsider the judgment
or to address other matters still pending in the action before it” . . . A
decree is final only when it disposes of the whole subject, gives all the
relief that is contemplated and leaves nothing to be done by the court
in the cause except its ministerial execution. Where further action of
the court in the cause is necessary to give completely the relief contemplated by the court, the decree is not final but interlocutory. 179

Notably to the court, the April 2015 order provided that the action remain on the docket for the court’s ability to enforce the premarital agreements. 180 Meanwhile, the October 2015 order “did not
contain any language to indicate that it was a final order regarding
the enforceability of the Agreements; there was no language indicating that there was nothing further to be done in the action” nor
was there language “which would bar the filing of a subsequent
show cause petition or the attempted enforcement of the Agreements in some other manner.” 181 And while the court had jurisdiction, it was “empowered to change a legal determination” and had
“the ability to not only reverse [the October 2018 order] but also to
grant a subsequent show cause petition.” 182 Hence, the October
2015 order could not be a “final judgment on the merits” and could
not serve as the basis for res judicata. 183

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 44, 809 S.E.2d at 634.
Id. at 44, 809 S.E.2d at 634 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-405 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
Id. at 45, 809 S.E.2d at 635 (citation omitted).
Id. at 46, 809 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 46, 809 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 46, 809 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 46, 809 S.E.2d at 635.
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There are two main practical takeaways from this case. First, if
additional claims or refiling of claims is a factor, make sure that
the order addressing the claim or requested relief has specific language addressing the merits and all the requested relief, and preferably strikes the case from the docket. Second, if a court retains
jurisdiction over the matter and it remains pending, a party will
face an uphill battle to show res judicata through an order in the
matter.
II. NEW LEGISLATION
A. Pro Se Minor Signatures
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01271.1 to clarify requirements regarding signatures by pro se minors. 184 The statute now provides that a pro se minor “shall sign
his pleading, motion, or other paper by his next friend.” 185 The statute further provides that one or both parents may sign on behalf of
the minor. 186 The exception to this provision is if such a signature
would violate the provisions of Virginia Code section 64.2-716
which, in relevant part, only allows a parent to sign when a “guardian of the estate or guardian for the child has not been appointed.” 187 This change codifies a common-sense approach and
practical analysis of the previous language.
B. Unlawful Detainer Procedural Changes
There have been several procedural changes relating to unlawful detainers. This article solely describes the procedural changes
and not the substantive changes.
First, upon entry of judgment and request from the plaintiff, the
court shall immediately issue a writ of possession. 188 But, certain
limitations still apply. First, the actual eviction cannot occur before
the defendant’s ten-day window to appeal expires. 189 Second, the

184. Act of Feb. 28, 2018, ch. 59, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
186. Id.
187. Id.; id. § 64.2-716 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
188. Id. § 8.01-129 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
189. Id.
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sheriff must provide written notice of the scheduled eviction, at
least seventy-two hours in advance of the execution. 190 The written
notice must comply with Virginia Code section 8.01-470. 191 These
changes simplify a procedural area that has been amended several
times in the past. 192 As a result of multiple changes and some ambiguity, the author has experienced certain courts that would
never issue a writ for immediate possession, some that would issue
one only upon default, and others that would not grant immediate
possession if rent had been awarded for the month during which
judgment was granted. The change simplifies the process without
encumbering a defendant’s right to appeal.
Second, the General Assembly also amended Virginia Code section 8.01-126 to specifically address the situation of a former owner
in a single-family residential dwelling occupying the premises after a foreclosure. 193 Such a former owner is now considered a “tenant at sufferance.” 194 The new owner may terminate that tenancy
“by a written termination notice,” which must be “given to such
tenant at least three days prior to the effective date of termination.” 195 After the three-day period expires, the new owner “may
file an unlawful detainer.” 196 Note that this period differs from the
usual five-day pay or quit notice. 197
Finally, the General Assembly clarified the required notice for
accepting rent with reservation. 198 A landlord must provide a written notice to the tenant that “any and all amounts owed to the
landlord by the tenant, including payment of any rent, damages,
money judgment, award of attorney fees, and court costs, would be
accepted with reservation and would not constitute a waiver of the
landlord’s right to evict the tenant from the dwelling unit.” 199 If
this notice is provided in the written termination notice, then no

190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Compare id. § 8.01-129 (Cum. Supp. 2018), with id. § 8.01-129 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
See Act of Mar. 9, 2018, ch. 255, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-126(C)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
194. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-126(C)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Compare id. § 8.01-126(C)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2018), with id. § 55-225 (Repl. Vol. 2017
& Cum. Supp. 2018).
198. See Act of Mar. 9, 2018, ch. 220, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 55-225.47, -248.34:1 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
199. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-225.47(A), -248.34:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2018).

DADAK 531 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

10/18/2018 8:37 AM

CIVIL PROCEDURE

35

subsequent notice is required after the landlord receives a payment. 200 This change simplifies the process and specifically eliminates the previous concern that a landlord waives the eviction process if they do not provide a written notice with each payment.
C. Motion or Petition for Show Cause for Violation of Court Order
The General Assembly enacted Virginia Code section 8.01-274.1
establishing a procedure for filing a motion or petition for a show
cause order for violation of a court order. 201 The motion or petition
must allege “facts identifying with particularity the violation of a
specific court order” and must “be sworn to or accompanied by an
affidavit setting forth such facts.” 202 As can be expected, the “rule
to show cause entered by the court shall be served on the person
alleged to have violated the court order, along with the accompanying motion or petition and any affidavit filed with such motion
or petition.” 203
III. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF COURT
There have not been major changes to the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia over the past year. Rule 5:1 was amended to add
subparagraph (g) requiring that filings and transmissions comply
with the Rules and specifically that pleadings or objects “shall not
be filed with or transmitted to any justice of this Court, unless expressly authorized by the Court.” 204 Hopefully, no practitioners
were running afoul of this practice before this amendment. Breaching the new rule could result in the “imposition of penalties.” 205
Rule 5:33, regarding oral argument on appeal, was amended to
handle the use of demonstrative exhibits at oral argument. The
newly added subparagraph (f) states that the use of demonstrative
exhibits requires “the prior consent of the Court.” 206 To obtain such
consent, a party, at least five business days before the argument,
200. Id.
201. Act of Mar. 29, 2018, ch. 522, 2018 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01274.1 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
202. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-274.1 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
203. Id.
204. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:1(g), www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/rulesofcourt.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
205. Id.
206. R. 5:33(f) (Repl. Vol. 2018).
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must send a letter to the clerk “with a copy to all other parties, . . .
describ[ing] the proposed demonstrative exhibit and the manner in
which it will be used.” 207 “The Court, in its discretion, may refuse
to allow the use of the demonstrative exhibit.” 208
Finally, the court amended Rule 4:12(d) to specify that any motion regarding discovery sanctions “must be accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted
to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action.” 209 This revision codifies a long-standing
practice among Virginia attorneys.

207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
R. 4:12(d) (Repl. Vol. 2018).

